Gecko [ nrupathungauniversityblr.ac.in ]

Name	Size	Permission
10-console-messages.conf	77 B	-rw-r--r--
10-ipv6-privacy.conf	490 B	-rw-r--r--
10-kernel-hardening.conf	1.2 KB	-rw-r--r--
10-magic-sysrq.conf	1.16 KB	-rw-r--r--
10-network-security.conf	158 B	-rw-r--r--
10-ptrace.conf	1.26 KB	-rw-r--r--
10-zeropage.conf	506 B	-rw-r--r--
README.sysctl	798 B	-rw-r--r--

Code Editor : 10-kernel-hardening.conf

# These settings are specific to hardening the kernel itself from attack
# from userspace, rather than protecting userspace from other malicious
# userspace things.
#
#
# When an attacker is trying to exploit the local kernel, it is often
# helpful to be able to examine where in memory the kernel, modules,
# and data structures live. As such, kernel addresses should be treated
# as sensitive information.
#
# Many files and interfaces contain these addresses (e.g. /proc/kallsyms,
# /proc/modules, etc), and this setting can censor the addresses. A value
# of "0" allows all users to see the kernel addresses. A value of "1"
# limits visibility to the root user, and "2" blocks even the root user.
kernel.kptr_restrict = 1

# Access to the kernel log buffer can be especially useful for an attacker
# attempting to exploit the local kernel, as kernel addresses and detailed
# call traces are frequently found in kernel oops messages. Setting
# dmesg_restrict to "0" allows all users to view the kernel log buffer,
# and setting it to "1" restricts access to those with CAP_SYSLOG.
#
# dmesg_restrict defaults to 1 via CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT, only
# uncomment the following line to disable.
# kernel.dmesg_restrict = 0

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Code Editor : 10-kernel-hardening.conf